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IS ENDURANTISM REALLY MORE PLAUSIBLE 
THAN PERDURANTISM FROM A COMMON-SENSE 
PERSPECTIVE?
Flavia Felletti
Universidad de Duisburg-Essen
Abstract
I will discuss three arguments in favor of perdurantism, the thesis that 
objects persist by having temporal parts located at different times. Firstly, 
I will introduce the rival accounts of persistence of perdurantism and 
endurantism. Then I will discuss three arguments for perdurantism: the 
problem of temporary intrinsics, the argument from vagueness and the 
argument from Special Relativity. I will conclude that none of them represents 
a knock-down argument for perdurantism. However, endurantism faces 
important difficulties in offering its solutions to the issues at stake, and the 
solutions proposed are often at odds with commonsense. Therefore, if one of 
the main problem for perdurantism is its being at odds with commonsense, 
endurantism is in no better position with respect to this issue. 
Keywords: persistence; endurantism; perdurantism; temporary intrinsics; 
vagueness.
¿Es realmente más plausible el endurantismo que el 
perdurantismo de acuerdo con el sentido común?
Resumen
En este artículo discutiré tres de los principales argumentos a favor de 
que los objetos persisten al tener partes temporales ubicadas en diferentes 
momentos. A este punto de vista se ha denominado perdurantismo. En 
la primera sección, presentaré dos teorías rivales de la persistencia, el 
perdurantismo y el endurantismo. A continuación discutiré tres argumentos 
a favor del perdurantismo: el argumento a partir de los intrínsecos 
temporales, el argumento de la vaguedad y el argumento de la relatividad 
especial. Concluiré que ninguno de estos argumentos es conclusivo a favor 
del perdurantismo, pero mostraré que el endurantismo enfrenta dificultades 
importantes para ofrecer sus soluciones a los problemas relevantes, y que las 
soluciones propuestas son a menudo en desacuerdo con el sentido común. 
En consecuencia, si uno de los principales problemas para el perdurantismo 
radica en su desacuerdo con el sentido común, el endurantismo no está en 
una mejor posición. 
Palabras clave: persistencia; endurantismo; perdurantismo; intrínsecos 
temporales; vaguedad.
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IS ENDURANTISM  REALLY MORE PLAUSIBLE 
THAN PERDURANTISM FROM A COMMON-SENSE 
PERSPECTIVE?1
Flavia Felletti
Universidad de Duisburg-Essen
Introduction
There are two main rival accounts of persistence over time. Endurantism 
is the thesis that objects persist by being wholly present at any time of their 
existence. Perdurantism is the thesis that objects persist by having temporal 
parts dislocated among the spans of time in which they exist. 
Endurantism seems to be the view most favored by commonsense, 
whereas perdurantism and the metaphysics of temporal parts have been 
criticized by many. Among these, Thomson (1983, p.210) defined it as “crazy 
metaphysics – obviously false”, while Van Inwagen claimed of temporal 
parts: ‘I think that no one understands what they are supposed to be, though 
of course plenty of philosophers think they do’ (Van Inwagen 1981, p. 90). 
However, never mind how peculiar perdurantism and the metaphysics of 
temporal parts might sound, perdurantists believe that there are very good 
arguments supporting their view. 
In this paper, I will discuss three of the main arguments in favor of 
perdurantism: the problem of temporary intrinsics (Lewis 1986, Sider 1997, 
2001), the argument from vagueness (Sider 1997, 2001, and 2008), and the 
argument from Special Relativity (Putnam 1967, Dorato 2013). 
1  I would like to thank Sven Rosenkanz, Francesco Gallina, and Alessio Santelli for their 
useful comments on a previous version of this paper.
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I will conclude none of such arguments constitutes a knock-down 
argument in favor of perdurantism. Indeed, endurantists can reply to any of 
these arguments by proposing different solutions to the issues at stake. But 
what emerges from the discussion is that endurantists certainly face important 
difficulties in offering their own solutions, and that many of these solutions 
appear to be as much in conflict with commonsense as perdurantism is. 
Thus, if one of the main problem for perdurantism consists of its being at 
odds with commonsense, endurantism is in no better position with respect 
to this issue. 
Perdurantism and Endurantism
There are two very different ways of thinking about time and the 
structure of reality that derives from it. Presentism is the thesis that only 
the present time is real. Fourdimensionalism is rather the thesis that past, 
present, and future are all equally real; and that time is a fourth dimension 
– analogous to the three dimensions of space – along which reality extends. 
These two different accounts of time and reality are generally associated 
with two contrasting accounts of persistence. Presentism is usually (but 
not always2) associated with endurantism, whereas fourdimensionalism 
generally (but not always3) goes hand in hand with perdurantism, and many 
philosophers define fourdimensionalism in conjunction with perdurantism4. 
A good introduction to these two different accounts of persistence can be 
provided by following the characterization of them provided by Lewis:
Something perdures iff it persists by having different temporal parts, or 
stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly present at more 
than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists by being wholly present at 
more than one time. Perdurance corresponds to the way a road persists 
through space; part of it is here and part of it is there, and no part of it is 
wholly present at two different places. Endurance corresponds to the way 
a universal, if there are such things, would be wholly present wherever and 
whenever it is instantiated. Endurance involves overlap: the content of two 
different times has the enduring thing as a common part. Perdurance does 
not (1986, p. 201)
Let’s discuss these two views in order. First, Perdurantism. Perdurantism 
is the thesis according to which objects persist by having temporal parts 
located at different times of the objects’ existence. In this sense, objects can 
2 E.g., Brogaard (2000) argues that presentism is compatible with perdurantism. 
3 E.g., Parsons (2000) defends fourdimensionalism while rejects perdurantism.
4 Among these, e.g., Sider (1997) and Jackson (1998).  
80
Is
 e
n
d
u
ra
n
ti
sm
 r
ea
ll
y 
m
o
re
 p
la
u
si
bl
e 
th
an
 p
er
d
u
ra
n
ti
sm
 ..
.  
be though as “spacetime worms”, which extends through space by having 
different spatial parts, and also through time by having different temporal 
parts located at different times. Following the analogy that Lewis draws 
with the road, all temporal parts are located along the fourth dimension of 
time, one at any of the times covered by the existence of a considered object. 
They might be more or less distant from a considered time of reference, they 
can be far in the past, or in the future, but this does not make them less real 
than all the parts that are accessible to us at any present time. In the end, 
we would not say that what is located at the end of a road we are on is not 
real only because it is far from us. 
Moreover, as well as no proper part of an object coincides with the 
whole object to which it belongs, none of the temporal parts of an object 
coincides with the whole object itself. Indeed, the object is bigger than all 
its parts at least in its temporal dimension5. To clarify this, consider the 
following example. Consider a person along the duration of her whole life. 
At first sight, such person as a newborn and such person as an old woman 
do not share many characteristics. Despite this, we might be likely to think 
that she as a newborn and she as an old woman are one and the same person. 
Indeed, those who endorse the perdurantist account of persistence would 
say that the newborn and the old woman are both temporal parts of the same 
person, for any stage of a person’s life corresponds to a temporal part of 
her; where the extension of a person along the fourth dimension is certainly 
bigger than the one of any of her temporal parts.
Furthermore, temporal parts might have spatial parts, just as spatial 
parts might have temporal parts (Loux 1998). A temporal part of a person 
at a time t might be a newborn. Such a newborn obviously extends through 
the three spatial dimensions, by having, let us say, her feet around nineteen 
inches distant from her head. Analogously, the spatial parts of a person also 
have temporal parts. A person grows and gets older over time. She grows 
teeth as a child, and wrinkles when she gets older. Teeth and wrinkles are 
not part of a person along her whole life; that is, their extension along the 
temporal dimension does not completely overlap with the extension of the 
whole person along the same dimension. Furthermore, the spatial parts of a 
person also change over time. For instance, wrinkles become deeper. This 
means, wrinkles also have temporal parts, and some of the temporal parts 
of them are deeper than others6. And, it might also be possible that just as 
each spatial part of a person could be divided into smaller spatial parts, each 
5 Unless we believe in instantaneous objects.  
6 A clearer example might be provided by taking into consideration, e.g., bones. Bones 
may survive for long time after a person’s death. This means, they persist longer than the 
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temporal part of that person – and of her spatial parts – could be divided 
into smaller temporal parts7. The more these temporal parts are close to one 
another along the temporal dimension, the more they might be qualitatively 
similar to each other. 
It might finally be possible that temporal parts could be divided as many 
times as to obtain instantaneous temporal parts. However, this matter is very 
controversial and not all perdurantists commit themselves to the existence of 
instantaneous temporal parts. Heller (1984), for example, remains neutral on 
the question. By contrast, Sider (2001, p.67) claims: ‘I define temporal parts 
as (mereologically) large enough parts that are instantaneous, but perhaps the 
definition should require that temporal parts be essentially instantaneous’. 
But whether or not temporal parts can be instantaneous is of no import for 
most of the arguments in favor of perdurantism.
Finally, Endurantism. Roughly speaking, endurantism is the view 
according to which objects persist by being wholly present at any time of 
their existence. A person that exists at some times t1, t2,..., tn exists at each 
of these times in all her entirety. That is, saying that she exists at t1 simply 
means that she exists at that time, and not that one of her temporal parts 
does. Indeed, endurantists deny that objects have temporal parts. According 
to endurantists objects are three dimensional, extend through space, and 
endure through time. And at any time in an interval throughout which an 
object endures, such an object is numerically identical with itself. Following 
Loux (1998), expressions such as ‘The Loux of yesterday’ and ‘The Loux of 
today’ both denote a single concrete particular, for persistence is conceived 
as ‘the numerical identity of one thing existing at one time with a thing 
existing at another time’ (Loux 1998, p.231). That is, Loux is numerically 
identical with himself at any time of his existence. 
Now that the two contrasting views of endurantism and perdurantism 
have been introduced, we can proceed by discussing some of the arguments in 
favor and against either view. Since the view most favored by commonsense 
is (at least apparently) endurantism – for it does not require any strong 
departure from the commonsense conception of time and parthood – I will 
focus on the arguments that support the more radical view of perdurantism, 
and I will discuss some of the counterarguments that endurantists provide 
against this view. I will conclude that some of these counterarguments do 
whole body of the person to which they belong, and this in virtue of the fact that they have 
temporal parts located even after the person’s body ones along the fourth dimension.  
7 This is we consider time to be dense or continuous. However, fourdimensionalists are 
not necessarily committed to say that time is dense, for it might be discrete, i.e., that for any 
instant there is a next instant and an immediately preceding instant (Shoemaker 1969, p.376). 
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not put endurantism in a better position than perdurantism as long as the 
problem of being at odds with commonsense is concerned.
The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics
One of the main arguments in favor of perdurantism relies on the 
possibility for such an account of persistence to offer a solution to the 
problem of temporary intrinsics. Let us introduce the problem as presented 
by Lewis:
Persisting things change their intrinsic properties. For instance shape: 
when I sit, I have a bent shape; when I stand, I have a straightened shape. 
Both shapes are temporary intrinsic properties: I have them only some of 
the times. How is such change possible? (1986, p. 203-204)
The solution favored by Lewis appeals to the existence of temporal 
parts. Following his reasoning, different temporary intrinsics belong to 
different things; namely, to different temporal parts of the same person. 
Accordingly, the property of being bent-shaped belongs to some of Lewis’s 
temporal parts, just as the property of being straight-shaped belongs to other 
temporal parts of him. One reason for favoring this solution, also pointed 
out by Sider (2008) is that it seems prima facie to avoid entering in conflict 
with Leibniz’s Law: 
(LL) For any x and y, if x is identical to y, then x and y have all the 
same properties: 
∀x ∀y[x = y → ∀P (Px↔Py)]
For the perdurantists might say that Lewis bent-shaped and Lewis 
straight-shaped are two different objects, in virtue of the fact that they have 
different intrinsic properties at different times. 
According to a first formulation of the challenge, instead, endurantists 
are committed to contradict (LL) for they claim that objects are numerically 
identical with themselves over time, despite the fact that they change their 
(intrinsic) properties.
However, as Sider (2008) claims, this argument is not satisfying. The 
reason why it is so becomes clear if we assume a “timeless perspective” of 
reality. Indeed, the property of being bent-shaped and the property of being 
straight-shaped belong to the very same person; namely, to Lewis. What 
must be specified, then, is that such properties belong to Lewis at different 
times: Lewis is bent-shaped, e.g., at t1, and he is straight-shaped, e.g., at t2. 
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But by elaborating this argument, Sider notes, another argument in favor 
of temporal parts emerges.
If we consider, indeed, the properties that an object has from the timeless 
perspective, such properties can be seen as temporally indexed properties; 
i.e., properties that an object has in relation to times. The advantage that 
those who endorse perdurantism have over those who deny the existence 
of temporal parts is that temporal parts – by existing only at a single time – 
can have non-indexed properties. In this sense, then, objects considered in 
their whole temporal existence have temporally indexed properties, but the 
temporal parts of which they are constituted have non-indexed properties: 
they have them simpliciter. 
On the contrary, those who deny the existence of temporal parts are 
committed to say that properties such as ‘being bent-shaped’ or ‘being 
straight-shaped’ are all fundamentally indexed properties. This also means 
that these properties are not intrinsic properties, but are rather relational; 
they are relational in the sense that they are relations to times. The reason 
why we might not want to commit ourselves to the claim that all properties 
are relational is that there is a clear sense in which properties such as ‘being 
bent-shaped’ and ‘being straight-shaped’ are different from other properties 
that certainly are relational. Consider, for instance, the property of being-
a-sister. Having the property of being a sister necessarily depends on the 
existence of another person; namely, on the existence of another daughter 
or son born from the same parents. In other words, there is no such thing as 
“being a sister per se”, for a sister in necessarily a sister of another person. 
The problem of reducing properties as ‘being bent-shaped’ and ‘being 
straight-shaped’ to relational properties, then, is that this move levels the 
distinction between this kind of properties and all those properties that are 
commonly regarded as genuinely relational – such as ‘being a sister’ – and 
that are intuitively very different in their nature.
However, as I see it, an essential distinction between “genuinely 
relational properties” such as being-a-sister, and properties such as being 
straight-shaped might still hold. Indeed, whereas in the first case the property 
in question exists in relation both to time and to another individual, in the 
latter case the property would exist simply as in relation to time. Tentatively, 
a possible solution might be to distinguish then between different kinds 
of relations and to categorize the properties that an object can have on 
the basis of its possibility to have such properties in relation either only 
to times, or also to other objects or individuals. I find this solution quite 
appealing, although it requires the acceptance of the claim that all properties 
are relational, which implies itself an important departure from our way of 
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conceiving properties. And, as long as the plausibility from a commonsense 
perspective is at stake, such a departure might constitute a good reason to 
reject this alternative.
Another possible solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics 
discussed – and also discarded – by Lewis (1986)8 is to say that the only 
intrinsic properties that an object has are those properties that it has at the 
present time, and that other times do not exist at all. That means, all existing 
objects would exist in the present, and past and future times would be all 
equally unreal. 
Lewis rejects this argument because, according to him, it goes against 
what is commonly believed, for ‘No man, unless it being the moment of 
his execution, believes that he has no future; still less does anyone believe 
that he has no past’ (Lewis 1986, p. 204). This argument has not been 
developed in any depth by Lewis. However, the acceptability of the claim 
that no one would believe that he has neither future, nor past, might be more 
controversial. It depends, for example, on what is meant by having a past or 
a future, and on what it means that all times, except the present one, do not 
exist. Very much might depend on what is meant by the existence of other 
times. For, surely not many would be likely to say that their past and their 
future are both as real as their present is; or – generalizing – that the times 
of dinosaurs and future civilizations exist in the same sense in which the 
present time does. Plausibly, a more specific characterization of existence 
and reality would be required in order to provide a better evaluation of this 
possible solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics. 
However, many arguments9 against the unreality of past and future 
times – that is, against presentism – as well as replies to these arguments10 
have been discussed in the literature of the Philosophy of Time. I will 
partly discuss this issue in the fourth section of this paper, together with the 
argument from Special Relativity.
Finally, a further alternative that endurantists might embrace to solve to 
problem of temporary intrinsics consists of saying that properties are tensed11. 
Following this solution, properties would not be relations to time, but they 
could still be intrinsic. Yet, one and the same object x may once have had a 
property F, but no longer has it. This would not imply that only the present 
time exists, nor that the only properties that an object has are those that it 
instantiates at the present time. Going back to Lewis’s example, assuming 
that Lewis-in-the-past is numerically identical with Lewis-in-the-present, 
8 But supported by Merricks (1999), as we will see in the last section of this paper.  
9 See e.g. Sider (2001) for discussion.
10 See e.g. Markosian (2004) for discussion.  
11  I wish to thank Sven Rosenkranz for pointing out this alternative. 
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endurantists may say that, in the past, it was the case that Lewis was bent-
shaped; but, in the present, it is no longer the case that Lewis is bent-shaped, 
for he is straight-shaped12. Having been bent-shaped and being bent-shaped 
are not incompatible. Indeed, the fact that Lewis has been bent shaped in the 
past does not imply that Lewis presently is bent shaped in the past. 
A first thing to notice regarding this solution is that, even though it 
allows that not only the present time exists, it seems to draw an important 
distinction between the way the present time exists and the way past and 
future times do. Indeed, following this reasoning, it becomes misleading 
to claim that ‘past, present, and future times are all equally real’, for only 
what is present can be concrete. Roughly speaking, there is no bent-shaped 
Lewis presently physically located in the past. Rather, the notion of existence 
of past and future times to which this solution appeals is a very weak one. 
That is, saying that objects in the past exist, simply means that it is possible 
to quantify over them13.
However, this solution faces an important difficulty when considered 
within a relativistic framework, for it presupposes that the present time has 
a privileged existence with respect to past and future times. But, as we will 
see in more detail in the last section of this paper, one of the consequences 
of Special Relativity is exactly that it is no possible to determine in any 
absolute sense what is present, for what is present for an observer depends 
on the observer’s frame of reference. Therefore, if only what exists in the 
present can be concrete, then it is not possible to determine in any absolute 
sense what is concrete.
The Argument from Vagueness
A second, and more recent, argument in favor of perdurantism is the 
argument from vagueness (Sider 1997, 2001, and 2008). I will introduce 
this argument by discussing first a famous case in which vagueness occurs 
and showing how perdurantism might help to solve this case: the case of 
The Ship of Theseus, discussed in Sider (2001). 
Consider The Ship of Theseus, made of planks. Imagine that one starts 
to replace all planks, one by one, with other similar ones. Most of us would 
agree that The Ship of Theseus would survive the replacement of a single 
plank. (Let’s call the ship obtained after one replacement ‘Ship1’, Ship1 after 
a further replacement ‘Ship2’, and so forth.) The ship that we finally obtain by 
12 This supposing for a moment that Lewis still exists in the present, and that he now has 
the property of being straight-shaped.
13 A definition of existence that would be in accord with solution would be, e.g., Ǝx (x 
= m). And such definition is in no way committal to the claim that what exists is concrete.
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substituting one plank per time does not share any plank in common with the 
original Ship of Theseus. Following Sider, let’s call this ship ‘Replacement’.
Despite the fact that many of us would not agree that Replacement is 
identical with The Ship of Theseus, this is what we would be committed 
to say if we were to apply the Principle of Transitivity of Identity (if x = 
y, and y = z, then x = z) and together to accept that The Ship of Theseus 
survives the replacement of a single plank, and so does any ship obtained at 
any stage of the process. To clarify this, consider the following statements 
of identity (Sider 2001, p.7):
The Ship of Theseus = Ship1 
Ship1 = Ship2 
Ship2 = Ship3 
. 
. 
. 
Shipn-1 = Shipn 
Shipn = Replacement
Now imagine further that all planks removed from The Ship of Theseus 
were reassembled together into a new ship. Following Sider again, let’s 
call this ship ‘Planks’. We might want to say that The Ship of Theseus and 
Planks are identical with one another, for they are made of the same exact 
planks. The situation, indeed, seems analogous to a situation in which an 
object is simply disassembled and reassembled again exactly as it was 
before. We arguably would not say that disassembling and reassembling 
an object (as it was before) would create a new object. However, accepting 
this claim would bring about an important problem. And this is so, again, 
for the transitivity of identity. Following such principle, indeed, we would 
be committed to say that, despite the fact that they do not seem to share any 
relevant characteristic, Planks and Replacement are also identical with each 
other. In fact, if The Ship of Theseus is identical with Replacement for the 
transitivity of identity, and Planks is identical with The Ship of Theseus for 
they are made of the same exact planks, then Planks must also be identical 
with Replacement. But this does not seem to be the case.
Which is, then, the ship that really is identical with The Ship of Theseus? 
According to Sider (2001), an answer can be provided by accepting both 
fourdimensionalism – and the metaphysics of temporal parts – and the 
Principle of Unrestricted Mereological Composition, according to which 
every class of objects has a fusion, or mereological sum, i.e., a larger object 
of which these objects are constitutive parts. 
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Before discussing Sider’s solution, a clarification about the terminology 
employed by Sider might be needed. Indeed, Sider does not make any 
distinction between fourdimensionalism and perdurantism; for, as he defines 
it, fourdimensionalism comprises the metaphysics of temporal parts: 
As I see it, the heart of four dimensionalism is the claim that the part-whole 
relation behaves analogously with respect to time as it does with respect 
to space: just as things have arbitrary spatial parts, they likewise have 
arbitrary temporal parts. When applied to space, the idea that things have 
arbitrary parts means, roughly, that for any way of dividing the region of 
space occupied by a given object, there is a corresponding way to divide 
the object into parts which exactly occupy those regions of space. Applied 
to time, the idea is that to any way of dividing up the lifetime of an object 
into separate intervals of time, there is a corresponding way of dividing 
the object into temporal parts that are connected to those intervals of time 
(Sider 1997, p.7)
In this, Sider’s definition of fourdimensionalism is not limited to the 
conception of time as a fourth dimension along which reality extends and 
to the claim that past and future times are as real as the present time is (that 
is how I defined fourdimensionalism in the beginning of this paper), but it 
also comprises what I defined as perdurantism: the claim that objects have 
temporal parts just as they have spatial parts14. 
Following his definition of fourdimensionalism together with the 
principle of unrestricted mereological composition, we can see the 
fourdimensional world as a world of stages, whereas any set of these 
stages has a mereological sum. Among these mereological sums there are 
the spacetime worms that correspond to ordinary objects according to the 
perdurantist picture of reality. But accepting that any set of stages has a 
mereological sum means to accept that any set of stages (no matter how 
scattered and apparently unrelated) is part of a larger object of which those 
stages are constitutive parts. And this despite the fact that we usually do 
not name, think of, or quantify over all of them: ‘The world is therefore 
populated by a host of continuing spacetime worms, of which we name, 
14 Noteworthy, if might be though that Sider’s definition of fourdimensionalism 
simply is the view that I called ‘perdurantism’. But when I characterized perdurantism I 
specified that such an account of persistence is usually, but not necessarily, associated with 
fourdimensionalism, for some philosophers (see e.g. Brogaard 2000) defend the view that 
perdurantism could also be consistently associated with presentism. Indeed, I would say 
that Sider’s definition of fourdimensionalism is not the same as the one of perdurantism, but 
rather that it is a definition that binds together what I characterized as fourdimensionalism 
with what I characterized as perdurantism.
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think of, and quantify over a small minority’ (Sider 2001, p.8). Going back 
to the question of whether Planks or Replacement is identical with The Ship 
of Theseus, then, we could say that there is a spacetime worm corresponding 
to each answer. This can be explained as follows. 
Since each set of stages constitutes a spacetime worm, there can be a 
spacetime worm that traces any stage of the replacement process (Sider calls 
this “The Replacement Worm”). But there can also be a spacetime worm 
that traces the planks of the original Ship of Theseus at any of their stages 
(Sider calls this “The Original Planks Worm”); and it is co-located with 
The Ship of Theseus at the beginning of the process, and with Planks at the 
end of the process. These two spacetime worms, then, are two spacetime 
worms sharing some of their temporal parts15. Whether Replacement or 
Planks is identical with The Ship of Theseus, indeed, depends on which is 
the spacetime worm that we intend to refer to by means of the expression 
‘The Ship of Theseus’, which plausibly reflects our concept of ‘ship’. If we 
are referring to the spacetime worm that traces the planks of the original 
ship, we might want to say that it is Planks that is identical with The Ship 
of Theseus. Rather, if we are referring to the spacetime worm that traces 
the continuity in the ship’s shape, we might want to say that is Replacement 
that is identical with The Ship of Theseus. Perhaps our concept of ‘ship’ 
does not emphasize sameness of planks, or perhaps it is part of our concept 
of ‘ship’ that ships must retain the same planks.
However, these two are not the only spacetime worms that might be 
co-located at some time at which they co-exist with The Ship of Theseus. 
There might be, e.g., a spacetime worm which traces all the planks utilized 
for the replacement even before they are used to fill up the empty spaces 
left after the removal of the original planks. Or there might be a spacetime 
worm which comes into existence only when the original and the replacing 
planks are equally mixed up. These spacetime worms are not very likely 
to be taken into account, but this is so because we tend to trace objects 
15 Analogous considerations might apply to another argument in favor of temporal parts, 
that is, the argument from cohabitation, discussed – among others – by Heller (1984). In brief, 
imagine a situation in which a lump of clay is modeled into a statue. A lump of clay and a 
statue have very different properties. It seems, however, that the statue and the lump of clay 
come to coincide at the time in which the statute is created. How can two different objects, 
with very different properties, occupy the very same location at the very same time?  The 
endurantists’ answer that the lump of clay and the statue wholly coincide when the statue 
comes into existence contradicts both Leibniz’s Law and the Lockean Principle of Identity, 
according to which two objects occupying the same location at the same time are identical 
with each other. Perdurantists, instead, may solve this issue by saying that the two objects 
simply are two distinct objects sharing some, but not all, of their temporal parts.
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drawing what Sider (2008) defines as an “anthropocentric line” between 
those objects that we chose to recognize and to trace over time, and those 
that we do not. In other words, we chose to trace only the objects for which 
we have a name and that fit our ordinary beliefs about objects. But this 
represents an obstacle for us to explain away vagueness in cases such as 
the one of The Ship of Theseus, where it seems at least not easy to find a 
suitable alternative to establish the identity (or non-identity) between The 
Ship of Theseus and the two other ships respectively obtained by replacing 
and by reassembling all its planks. 
Accepting fourdimensionalism (as defined by Sider) and the principle 
of unrestricted mereological composition, instead, we could say that whether 
it is Planks or Replacement the ship that is identical with The Ship of 
Theseus simply depends on our concept of ‘ship’. And, Sider claims, even 
though fourdimensionalism alone does not provide a complete answer to 
the question regarding which ship is identical with The Ship of Theseus, 
the metaphysical puzzle would be dissolved, and the only question that 
would remain unanswered is the merely conceptual question of which of 
the spacetime worms counts as a ship.
However, an important fact about this argument is that it presupposes the 
acceptance of the principle of unrestricted mereological composition. And 
the argument that Sider (1997, 2001) offers in favor of such principle – that 
he considers both atemporally and diachronically – brings about, according 
to him, one of the most powerful arguments in favor of temporal parts. 
Before introducing Sider’s argument in favor of (diachronic) unrestricted 
mereological composition some definitions might be required. 
First, case of composition (or, in short, case). A case of composition is 
a possible situation involving a class of objects having certain properties 
and standing in certain relations. 
Second, assignment. Here assignment is intended as a function f that 
takes times as arguments and assigns non-empty classes of objects that exist 
at those times as values.
Third, diachronic fusion (D-fusion, in short). An object x is a diachronic 
fusion of an assignment f iff for every t in f’s domain, x is a fusion-at-t of f(t).
Fourth, minimal diachronic fusion. A minimal diachronic fusion of an 
assignment is a D-fusion of that assignment that exists only at times in the 
assignment’s domain.
With these four definitions at hand, we can now introduce Sider’s 
argument in favor of diachronic unrestricted mereological composition and 
in favor of temporal parts. The argument is structured in the three following 
premises (Sider 1997, p.26-27):
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P1: If not every assignment has a minimal D-fusion, then there must be a 
pair of cases connected by a “continuous series” such that in one, mini-
mal D-fusion occurs, but in the other minimal D-fusion does not occur. 
P2: In no continuous series is there an abrupt cutoff in whether minimal 
D- fusion occurs. 
P3: In any case of minimal D-fusion, either minimal D-fusion definitely 
occurs, or minimal D-fusion definitely does not occur.
The defence of the argument briefly runs as follows. Sider assumes that 
vagueness never arises from logic. Then he argues that all assignments have 
a minimal D-fusion, for a restriction on the assignments that have a minimal 
D-fusion would require a cutoff in a continuous series between a pair of two 
adjacent very similar cases. But since minimal D-fusion can never be vague, 
such cutoff would be an abrupt cutoff, and this is implausible. Therefore, 
there is no restriction on the assignments that have a minimal D-fusion; and 
this is so because all assignments have a minimal D-fusion. Let’s see now 
in more detail the defence of each premise.
First, Premise 1. Sider does not offer any positive argument in favor of 
this premise. Rather, he individuates two objections to it – as he claims, the 
only objections that he can think of – and proceeds by offering his counter-
objections to them. First, Nihilism: the view that (diachronic) fusion never 
occurs. According to this view, there are no composite objects (objects with 
proper parts); and consequently there is no continuous series connecting 
cases in which D-fusion occurs with cases in which D-fusion does not 
occur. However, strictly speaking, this view relies on the assumption that 
all those thing that we call ‘objects’ – as chairs, tables, and so on – do not 
really exist, rather all that exists are mereological atoms, that have no proper 
parts. The weakness of this assumption consist of the fact that it goes against 
the possibility that small particles, such as electrons and quarks, might be 
composed themselves of smaller particles, composed these of even smaller 
particles, and so on. Second, the objection that not every pair of cases is 
connected by a continuous series. For instance, no case with finitely many 
objects can be connected with a case with infinitely many objects by a 
continuous series. Still, it would be implausible to claim that a jump from 
finitude to infinity makes the difference on whether D-fusion occurs or 
whether it does not.
Second, Premise 2. A possible objection to this premise, instead, is 
represented by mereological essentialism; that is, the thesis that every 
object is a mereological sum, of which each part is essential to it; and that 
the object exists only as long as it maintains all its parts. Accepting this 
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view, it would be possible to restrict minimal D-fusion not vaguely, for an 
assignment would have a fusion only in the case in which such assignment is 
the temporally longest assignment for a considered class of objects. However, 
this view entails that no object survives to the loss of a part. And this seems 
quite at odds with our ordinary conception of objects, for – considering 
that any object faces at least the loss of some of its microscopic parts – no 
object would be identical with itself over time. Thus, if one of the main 
problems for the metaphysics of temporal parts concerns its being at odds 
with commonsense, mereological essentialism does not seem to be in any 
better position with respect to this issue. 
Third, Premise 3. The defense of this premise goes as follows. Sider 
assumes for reduction that P3 is false. If this were the case, then there could 
be vagueness on whether an assignment has or does not have a minimal 
D-fusion. But suppose we were counting all concrete objects in a world of 
finitely many objects. Then we would have to include all concrete objects 
in the set. Still, we would face a problem, for it would be indeterminate 
whether or not to include their minimal D-fusion. But this means that there 
would be a numerical sentence expressing the existence of a determinate 
finite number of concrete objects that would be neither true, nor false. For 
instance, consider the following numerical sentence expressing the existence 
of exactly two concrete objects:
(NS) ∃x∃y[Cx & Cy & x≠y & ∀z(Cz → [x=z ∨ y=z])] 
Where ‘Cx’ means ‘x is concrete’. This sentence contains only 
logical terms and the predicate ‘is concrete’, which has determinate 
application conditions. If it were indeterminate what the number of 
concrete objects in a finitely many objects world is, then the truth 
value of this sentence would be indeterminate. But since numerical 
sentences only contain logical terms and the predicate ‘concrete’, 
and vagueness never arises from logic (Sider’s assumption), then 
numerical sentences should be either true or false. This means, it 
cannot be vague whether a given assignment has or does not have a 
minimal D-fusion. That is, P3 is true. 
Now, since it is true that, in any case of minimal D-fusion, minimal 
D-fusion definitely occurs or definitely it does not, and since given 
P2 there is no abrupt cutoff between those assignments that have a 
minimal D-fusion and those that do not, then, by P1, every assignment 
has a minimal D-fusion: 
(U) Every assignment has a minimal D-fusion
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And, according to Sider (1997, 2001), (U) constitutes an argument in 
favor of fourdimensionalism (which, as he conceives it, is indiscernible 
from perdurantism), for this thesis is not available to those who deny the 
existence of temporal parts. And this is so for, if I understand it correctly, it 
is possible that there are two assignments f and f’, having in their domain t1 
and t2, such that that, at t1, f(t1) = f’(t1); but, at t2, f(t2) ≠ f’(t2). Intuitively, 
this would be a case in which the two assignments f and f’ would comprise 
the classes of objects that constitute, e.g., an object x1, at t1. But, at t2, f and 
f’ would comprise the classes of objects that constitute two distinct objects, 
e.g., x2 and x3. That is, the classes of objects that constitute the single object 
x1, at t1, could successively constitute two distinct objects (x2 and x3) at t2. 
The easiest way to account for such possibility, then, would be to say that 
the three objects have some, but not all, of their temporal parts in common, 
and that they are co-located at t1, but not at t2.
However, there is the possibility that (U) is an option also available to 
those who endorse endurantism (Varzi 2005). Indeed, there are two possible 
alternatives that endurantists might endorse to explain a situation in which 
two objects are co-located at a time, e.g., t1, but not at a successive time, 
e.g., t2, while maintaining the idea that the two objects are wholly present 
at both times. Let’s discuss these two alternatives in turn.
First, contingent identity. Following this alternative, two objects, e.g., 
x1 and x2, are identical with each other at t1, for they are composed of the 
exact same parts and occupy exactly the same location, but are distinct at 
t2, for they are composed of different parts and occupy distinct locations. 
But this would mean to say that the two objects, considered in their entirety, 
would be identical at some times, but distinct at other times. And probably 
not many would be likely to endorse the view that there is such thing as 
“occasional identity”.
Second, massive co-location. According to this alternative, x1 and x2 are 
distinct both at t1 and at t2, even though at t1 their parts are fully coincident 
and they occupy the same exact location. But this would violate the Lockean 
principle of identity, according to which two objects occupying the very 
same place at the very same time are identical with each other. Moreover, 
x1 and x2 would not be the only two objects coinciding at t1. For, accepting 
the principle of (diachronically) unrestricted mereological composition, 
there would be many other objects wholly coinciding at t1: ‘one for each 
possible assignment fk such that fk(t1) = f(t1)’ (Varzi 2005, p.15). For, 
given an object x at a time t1, it is possible that at a successive time, e.g., 
t2, the class of objects that constitute x at t1 would finally be part of a great 
number of further objects x1, x2, ..., xn. Again, if one of the main problems 
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for the metaphysics of temporal parts consists of its being at odds with the 
commonsensical picture of reality, endurantism would not be in any better 
position if it accepted this alternative.
In conclusion, the argument from vagueness, even though it might 
be useful to explain away cases in which vagueness occurs – as the one 
of Theseus’ Ship discussed above – and the argument for unrestricted 
mereological composition, that is at its base, do not represent a knock-down 
argument in favor of perdurantism, for many other options are available 
that could block this argument at each of its premises. However, the main 
alternatives available, constituted by the acceptance of either nihilism, or 
mereological essentialism, or occasional identity, or massive co-location do 
not seem in any better position than perdurantism as far as the departure from 
commonsense is concerned. There might still be, of course, further reasons 
for favoring one of the considered available alternatives, but an analysis of 
such reasons goes beyond the scope of this paper.
The Argument from Special Relativity
A last argument in favor of perdurantism is the argument from Special 
Relativity. I will discuss this argument in two steps. Firstly, I will briefly 
present Merrick’s (1999) thesis according to which endurantism implies 
presentism. Secondly, I will discuss the argument from Special Relativity 
against presentism (Cf. Putnam 1967, Sklar 1981, and Saunders 2002), 
which, if Merrick’s argument is correct, constitutes an indirect argument 
against endurantism.
First, endurantism implies presentism. This argument relies on the 
problem of temporary intrinsics and develops further the solution discarded 
by Lewis (1986) that the only properties that an object has are those 
properties that it has at the present time, whereas past and future times are 
all equally unreal. Noteworthy, Merricks extends his argument not only to 
properties, but also to parts. In sum, Merrick’s argument runs as follows. 
Consider an object x existing (at least) at two times t1 and t2. Suppose 
that x has an (intrinsic) property F, or a part P, at t1; but that it lacks such a 
property, or part, at t2. Endurantists appear to fall in contradiction, for they 
are committed to say that x, being it wholly present both at t1 and at t2, both 
has and lacks respectively the property F and the part P. However, this 
apparent contradiction can be explained away by accepting presentism, for 
presentists would say that the only properties, or parts, that an object has are 
those properties, or parts, that it has at the present time. For, no other time is 
real. The fact that x had the property F, and the part P, at t1 does not imply, 
indeed, that it has them at the present time; therefore, no contradiction arises. 
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On the contrary, a non-presentist endurantist must deny that objects 
have intrinsic properties; which is a consequence that not everyone would 
want to accept for the same reasons provided in the first section of this 
paper. Following this reasoning, Merricks (1999, p. 5) defines endurantism 
as follows:
(E) For any presently existing object O, O endures if and only if O persists 
and all of O’s [properties or] parts simpliciter exist at the present time.
Indeed, he claims, the only way to make consistent the endurantist 
thesis that objects are wholly present at any time in which they exist with 
the possibility of change in parts and in properties is to endorse presentism. 
In fact, for the presentist, only one time is real. So, suppose that O is an 
enduring object and that it exists – and is wholly present - at a present time 
t. All parts and properties of O exist simpliciter at t. But suppose then that 
time passes and that t is no longer present, for t’ is now present, and that 
O exists – and is wholly present - at t’. O has all its parts and properties 
simpliciter at t’. And the fact that O may have changed its part or properties 
from t to t’, and that it was wholly present at t and is wholly present at t’ does 
not lead to any contradiction, for when t’ is present t is no longer present. 
And, given that only the present time is real, then, t’ is no longer real, so 
that O does not have those parts and properties that it had at t but does not 
have at the present time t’. In virtue of this, by combining endurantism with 
presentism, we can say that whenever an enduring object exists at a present 
time it has all parts and properties simpliciter at that time. And, given that 
such an object may change its parts and properties over time, which parts 
and properties it has simpliciter vary depending on which time is present. 
Thus, we might think that accepting presentism, at least one of the main 
problems for endurantism – the problem of temporary intrinsics – can be 
easily explained away. However, it is certainly true that presentism faces 
important difficulties itself, especially when considered within a relativistic 
framework16.
One of the main consequences of Special Relativity is indeed the 
Relativity of Simultaneity, according to which whether or not two events 
are simultaneous depends on the observer’s frame of reference. And, since 
according to Special Relativity (at least in its Minkowskian formulation), 
there is no privileged frame of reference, then it is not possible to determine 
in any absolute sense whether two events are simultaneous. This means, it is 
not even possible to determine which events are simultaneous with a given 
present time. And, since for the presentists all that is real is what exists in 
16 See also Meyer (2005) for further objections against presentism.
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the present – that is, what is simultaneous with the present time – then it is 
not possible to determine in any absolute sense what is real17. Presentists 
seem committed, then, to relativize the reality of objects and events to 
frames of reference, which is a consequence they might not want to accept 
for it is absurd. More concisely, the fourdimensionalist argument against 
presentism runs as follows:
P1: Since, according to presentism, all and only those events that are pre-
sent exist, then if two events e1 and e2 are both present for an observer 
O, then they co-exist for O. 
P2: If two events e1 and e2 are not both present for an observer O, then, for 
the presentists, they do not co-exist for O, for only those events that are 
present exist. 
P3: The notion of existence should not be relativized to frames of referen-
ce. That is, if two events e1 and e2 co-exist for an observer O, then they 
should also co-exist for an observer O’ moving relative to O. 
But suppose that two events e1 and e2 are both present for an observer 
O, and that, whereas e1 is also present for an observer O’ moving relative to 
O, e2 is actually future (or past) for O’. Then e1 exists both for O ad for O’, 
whereas e2 exists for O but not for O’. And this is so because e1 is present 
relative to O but not relative to O’. But this contradicts P3, for it implies that 
the same event does not exist for both the two observers O and O’ in virtue 
of the fact that such an event is located in the present relative to the frame 
of reference of O, but it is located in the future (or in the past) relative to the 
frame of reference of O’. This would be absurd, thus it seems that the claim 
that only those events that are present exist must be rejected.
However, there might still be some alternatives that presentists could 
embrace to make compatible their account of existence and reality with the 
conception of spacetime in a relativistic framework. I will briefly discuss 
two of them considered by Sider (2001). 
First, the so called “here-now-ism”. They may say that only a single point 
of spacetime is real, and that such point coincides with the absolute present. 
In this sense, then, simply there are no spatiotemporally distant events. The 
main problem with this view, however, resides in the fact that it not only 
denies the existence of past and future times, but also denies the existence 
17 This is the same problem that the last possible endurantist solution to the problem of 
temporary intrinsics – i.e., claiming that intrinsic properties are tensed – faces. Indeed, if 
only what exists in the present can be concrete, while past and future things might exist in a 
far weaker sense, given that it is not possible to determine in any absolute sense what exists 
simultaneously with a considered present moment, then it is not possible to determine in 
any absolute sense what can exist as concrete.
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of any object located outside a single point. And, since no macroscopic 
object can fit into a single point, it is hard to see how all objects commonly 
regarded as existent would fit into reality. 
Second, the acceptance of a privileged frame of reference. Assuming 
the existence of a privileged frame of reference F, the presentist might claim 
that all that exists and is real coincides with what is present with respect 
to F. This would allow the presentist to accept the existence of spatially 
distant objects and events. However, it is also true that the postulation of 
a privileged frame of reference is scientifically revisionary, for accepting 
an absolute relationship of simultaneity between distant events contradicts 
what is widely considered as the main consequence of Special Relativity. 
I do not have the necessary scientific competences for arguing against this 
view. But I simply do not see any reason other than defending presentism 
in a relativistic framework to accept the scientifically revisionary claim that 
there is a privileged frame of reference. Certainly, further reasons might 
come in the future from science itself; but since (at least to my knowledge) 
such reasons are not available at the moment, I take this view to be mostly 
motivated by commonsense, for plausibly presentism is the view that 
commonsense favors. If we accept the consequences of Special Relativity 
as they have been presented to us by science, then, it seems plausible to 
claim that fourdimensionalism is the view that most straightforwardly fits 
in a relativistic framework18.
Before, we have discussed Merrick’s (1999) argument in favor of the 
claim that endurantism implies presentism. If we buy this argument, then 
we might say that endurantism is incompatible with Special Relativity. 
Therefore, assuming that perdurantism and endurantism exhaust the 
options, Special Relativity would seem to offer an argument in favor of 
perdurantism. But we have also seen that Merrick’s argument does not 
represent a conclusive argument for the necessary association of endurantism 
with presentism, for such argument might still be rejected by claiming that 
objects have properties (or parts) in relation to time, i.e., that all properties 
(and parts) are relational. Here much depends on whether we are disposed 
to take a desparture from our way of conceiving properties and reject the 
existence of intrinsic properties (and of parts possessed simpliciter) to 
embrace the view that they are relativized to times. Thus, as I see it, the issue 
concerning whether or not endurantism implies presentism remains open. 
And, even though we might agree that presentism is undermined by Special 
18 For further discussion, see also Savitt (2000) against the presentist alternatives proposed 
by Godfrey-Smith (1979) and Weingard (1972).
97
F
la
vi
a 
F
el
le
tt
i
relativity, Special Relativity still does not offer a conclusive argument in 
favor of perdurantism19.
Conclusion
In this paper, I discussed three of the main arguments in favor of the 
perdurantist account of persistence over time: the problem of temporary 
intrinsics, the argument from vagueness, and the argument from Special 
Relativity. What emerges from the discussion is that none of them constitutes 
a conclusive argument in favor of perdurantism. Indeed, those who endorse 
the rival view of endurantism can reply to any of these arguments by offering 
different solutions to the issues at stake. However, most endurantist solutions 
appear to be at odds with commonsense. Commonsense might not be the 
primary issue with which a metaphysical theory ought to be concerned, but 
it is important to notice that a good part of the criticism to perdurantism 
relies exactly on its poor plausibility from the commonsense perspective. 
This considered, if one of the main problems for the perdurantist account 
of persistence concerns its being at odds with commonsense, endurantism 
does not appear to be in any better position with respect to this issue. And 
endurantism loses then one of its greatest advantages. 
19 Parson (2000) proposed a further alternative, which might make fourdimensionalism 
compatible with endurantism. According to this alternative, temporally indexed properties 
- such as being bent-shaped or being straight-shaped – can be understood as intrinsic if they 
are understood as distributional properties. Parsons (2000, p.11) claims: 
Wherever we have a temporally indexed property of being X-at-t, we have a number 
of corresponding permanent distributional properties: the X-ness distributions. X-at-t is a 
disjunction of some of those X-ness distributions, the ones that are compatible with being 
X-at-t’. 
Following this reasoning, we can think of an object has having, e.g., a permanent 
“being-straight-shapedness” distribution, whose disjunctions correspond to the properties 
of being-straight-shaped-at-t1/t2/.../tn. Where t1, t2, ..., tn correspond to all times at which such 
an object instantiates the property of being straight-shaped. I do not have any argument 
against this view, if not the fact that it is a view that requires itself an important departure 
from our ordinary way of understanding properties. And that at least not all philosophers 
who endorse either endurantism or fourdimensionalism (or that might want to endorse both 
views together) might want to accept this view.  
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